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CHAPTER

11

GAPS IN THE GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE JURISPRUDENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID
CRIMINAL COURTS:
CAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW HELP?

Susana SáCouto*

Summary
Great progress has been made over the last two decades in the investigation
and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence, in particular by the ad
hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR). Yet the practice and jurisprudence of these tribunals makes
clear that significant challenges remain, including inconsistency in how to
understand – and therefore how to prove and adequately link to higher level
perpetrators – crimes of sexual violence committed in the context of conflict,
mass violence or repression. This chapter examines these challenges and
explores whether human rights law, particularly the requirement that access to
justice be free from gender-based discrimination, can be used to help address
the challenges. It suggests that application of the fundamental human rights
principle of non-discrimination would encourage international tribunals to
develop a better, more nuanced understanding of when, why and how sexual
violence takes place during conflict or other instances of mass violence and,
therefore, assist them in better evaluating how the elements of sexual violence
crimes should be interpreted, what theories of criminal responsibility can and
should be used to prosecute such crimes, and/or whether such crimes should
be selected for investigation and prosecution.

*

Susana SáCouto is Director of the War Crimes Research Office at American
University Washington College of Law. This chapter is based on research dating back
to mid-2012.
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Chapter 11

Introduction

Sexual and gender-based violence during conflict and periods of repression
has been a problem of enormous magnitude in every region of the globe.1
While not merely an African problem, sexual violence has been committed
in epidemic proportions in many parts of Africa, including Rwanda,
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and
Sudan.2 Yet, historically, these crimes were rarely prosecuted, particularly
when government leaders were responsible for tolerating, encouraging or
orchestrating these crimes.3 As discussed below, however, the last two
decades have seen an incredible transformation in the treatment of sexual
and gender-based violence under international law. Indeed, great strides
have been made in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes, in
particular by the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
Nevertheless, many challenges remain, including (i) ambiguity in the
jurisprudence regarding whether prosecuting rape in the context of mass
atrocity crimes requires proof of ‘non-consent of the victim’; (ii) critique of
theories of criminal responsibility that have been relied upon to find
perpetrators – particularly top political or military leaders – accountable
for crimes of sexual violence; and (iii) inadequate investigation and
prosecution of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, even where
evidence of such crimes arguably warrants further investigation and/or
prosecution. This chapter examines these challenges and explores whether
human rights law, particularly the requirement that access to justice be free
from gender-based discrimination, can be used to help address the
challenges. It concludes that the obligation to comply with the nondiscrimination principle requires a gender-sensitive approach to the issues
of how the elements of sexual violence crimes should be interpreted, what
theories of criminal responsibility can and should be used to prosecute
such crimes, and what crimes should be selected for investigation or
prosecution.
1

2
3

‘Rape as a weapon of war: Accountability for sexual violence in conflict’
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, US Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
110th Cong (2008) (statement of Dr KD Askin, Senior Legal Officer, Open Society
Justice Initiative) (Askin Testimony) http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testi
mony.cfm?id=3225&wit_id=7081 (accessed 26 November 2012).
Askin Testimony (n 1 above), recounting stories of survivors of sexual abuse from the
DRC and discussing travelling to Rwanda, Uganda and Sierra Leone, ‘where sexual
violence has been committed in epidemic proportions, affecting millions of lives’.
Askin Testimony (n 1 above): ‘There was widespread acknowledgment that atrocities
such as massacres, torture, and slave labour were prosecutable, but there was
skepticism, even by legal scholars and military officials, as to whether rape was
sufficiently serious to be prosecutable in an international tribunal set-up to redress the
worst crimes.’ C Steains ‘Gender issues’ in RS Lee (ed) The International Criminal
Court: the making of the Rome Statute (1999) 357 358: ‘[I]t was only in relatively recent
times that sexual and gender violence in armed conflict shifted from the periphery of
the international community's focus towards the centre of debate, and was recognized
as an important issue in serious need of redress.’
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Advances in the prosecution of sexual and genderbased violence crimes before international
criminal tribunals

As mentioned above, historically, sexual and gender-based violence
committed in times of conflict, mass violence or repression was rarely
prosecuted, even when tolerated, encouraged or orchestrated by senior
leaders.4 In the past two decades, however, incredible advances have been
made in the effort to end impunity for such crimes. In a departure from the
statutes governing the international military tribunals established in the
wake of World War II, for instance, the statutes of the Yugoslav and
Rwanda Tribunals expressly include the crime against humanity of rape.5
Importantly, these tribunals have recognised that sexual violence may
constitute a number of additional crimes, including the war crimes of
torture6 and outrages upon personal dignity,7 the crimes against humanity
of enslavement8 and persecution;9 and sexual violence as an act of
genocide.10 In addition, the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) incorporates many of these advances,
enumerating a broad range of sexual and gender-based crimes as war
crimes and crimes against humanity.11 Thus, for example, the Rome
Statute includes specific gender-based crimes – including rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilisation
– under both the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions, and

4
5

6

7
8
9
10
11

As above.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (25 May 1993), Annex to UN Doc S/25704
(1993) (ICTY Statute) art 5 (including rape in the enumerated crimes against
humanity); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8 November
1994), Annex to UN Doc S/955 (1994) (ICTR Statute) art 3.
Prosecutor v Delalic & Others (16 November 1998) IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, para 475
(noting that ‘[t]he crime of rape is not itself expressly mentioned in the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions relating to grave breaches, nor in common article 3, and
hence its classification as torture and cruel treatment’).
Prosecutor v Furundzija (10 December 1998) IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, para 274
(finding the accused guilty of outrages upon personal dignity, including rape).
Prosecutor v Kunarac & Others (22 February 2001) IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Trial
Judgment, para 436.
Prosecutor v Brdjanin (1 September 2004) ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, para 15.
Prosecutor v Akayesu (2 September 1998) ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, para 113
(explaining that genocide entails causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group).
Steains (n 3 above) 358 (noting that the gender provisions in the Rome Statute
developed in the ‘wake of a number of important developments in the field of
international humanitarian law and advances in the international community’s
response to violence against women and women’s human rights’). See also V
Oosterveld ‘Gender-sensitive justice and the International Criminal Tribunal For
Rwanda: Lessons learned for the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 12 New England
Journal of International and Comparative Law 128 (describing the lessons learned from the
ad hoc tribunals’ experiences, notably the need for a ‘wide-ranging approach’ to
ensuring the effective investigation and prosecution of such crimes by incorporating
articles into the Rome Statute).
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adds a residual ‘sexual violence’ clause that allows the Court to exercise
jurisdiction over other serious sexual assaults of comparable gravity to the
named gender-based crimes.12 Moreover, for the first time, the Rome
Statute also includes ‘gender’ within the list of prohibited grounds of
persecution as a crime against humanity.13 In addition, the Court’s
Elements of Crimes recognise that, although rape is not listed as a form of
genocide under the Rome Statute, genocide committed by acts causing
‘serious bodily or mental harm’ may include ‘acts of torture, rape, sexual
violence or inhuman or degrading tr14eatment’. Similarly, the statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which was established in 2002
to try serious international crimes committed in Sierra Leone during its
civil war,15 recognises a range of sexual violence-based war crimes and
crimes against humanity, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution and forced pregnancy.16 Additionally, the SCSL has held that
the act of forced marriage constitutes a crime against humanity as an ‘other
inhumane act’ under the SCSL Statute.17
Equally important, the jurisprudence of these tribunals has recognised
that an accused need not have physically perpetrated a crime in order to
be found directly liable for that crime. Thus, in addition to convicting the
accused for physically perpetrating crimes of sexual violence,18 the
tribunals have held the accused criminally responsible for instigating,19

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 90
(1998) (Rome Statute) art 7(1)(g) (defining crime against humanity as ‘any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population ... (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity’); Rome Statute (above) art 8(2) (defining war crimes as ‘any of the following
acts ... (xxii) committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
as defined in article 7, paragraph 2(f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions’). Art
8(2)(e)(vi) enumerates the same crimes as art 8(2)(b)(xxii) committed in the context of
non-international armed conflicts.
Rome Statute (n 12 above) art 7(h).
International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes (9 September 2002) UN Doc
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) (ICC Elements of Crimes) art 6(b).
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) UNSC Res 1315,
Annex to UN Doc S/RES/1315 (2000) (SCSL Statute).
SCSL Statute (n 15 above) art 2(g) (noting that the Special Court shall have the power
to prosecute persons who commit rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, and any other form of sexual violence); SCSL Statute (n 15 above) art 3(e)
(noting that the Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who commit
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,
rape, forced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault).
Prosecutor v Brima & Others (22 February 2008) SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment,
paras 199-203 (AFRC Appeals Judgment) (holding that forced marriage constitutes a
crime against humanity of an ‘other inhumane act’ under the SCSL statute).
See eg Kunarac (n 8 above) paras 699-704.
Akayesu (n 10 above) para 692; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (17 June 2004) ICTR-2001-64-T,
Trial Judgment, para 292.
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ordering,20 and aiding and abetting21 such crimes. This has had significant
consequences for the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence committed
in the context of conflict, mass violence or repression, as such crimes are
often tacitly encouraged or tolerated, even if not perpetrated or officially
sanctioned, by the accused in positions of authority.22
Moreover, the ad hoc tribunals have recognised another direct form of
liability that allows an accused to be held responsible whenever he or she
intentionally takes part in criminal conduct with a plurality of actors. As
developed by the ad hoc tribunals, particularly the ICTY, this theory –
known as ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (JCE) or ‘common purpose’ liability –
allows the tribunals to hold perpetrators accountable not only for the
crimes originally intended by the group, but also for other crimes that were
the natural and foreseeable consequences of the intended crimes, as long
as the perpetrator was aware of the risk that such crimes were likely to be
committed and willingly took the risk.23 As the Yugoslav tribunal noted in
the Kvocka case, even where sexual violence is not explicitly part of the
original criminal plan,
[a]ny crimes that were natural or foreseeable consequences of the joint
criminal enterprise … including sexual violence, can be attributable to
participants in the criminal enterprise if committed during the time [the
accused] participated in the enterprise.24

There, the accused had been charged with crimes related to events that
took place within three camps established in the North-West of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, shortly after the Serb takeover of the city of Prijedor, to hold
persons suspected of sympathising with the opposition to the takeover.25
Although the tribunal found that the primary criminal enterprise was to
persecute and subjugate non-Serbs detained in the camp,26 it noted that the
accused could also be held criminally responsible for acts of sexual
violence committed during the time they participated in the enterprise, as
these were natural and foreseeable consequences of that enterprise. As the
tribunal reasoned:
In Omarska camp, approximately 36 women were held in detention, guarded
by men with weapons who were often drunk, violent, and physically and
mentally abusive and who were allowed to act with virtual impunity. Indeed,
it would be unrealistic and contrary to all rational logic to expect that none of
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Akayesu (n 10 above) para 692; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (7 July 2006) ICTR-2001-64-A,
Appeals Judgment, para 185-87.
Akayesu (n 10 above) para 692; Prosecutor v Nikolic (18 December 2003) IT-94-2-S,
Sentencing Judgment, para 119.
KD Askin ‘Prosecuting gender crimes committed in Darfur: Holding leaders
accountable for sexual violence’ in S Totten & E Markusen (eds) Genocide in Darfur:
Investigating the atrocities in Sudan (2006) 144.
Prosecutor v Tadic (15 July 1999)IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, para 220.
Prosecutor v Kvocka (2 November 2001) IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Judgment, para 327.
Kvocka (n 24 above) paras 2 & 15-21.
Kvocka paras 319-20.
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the women held in Omarska, placed in circumstances rendering them
especially vulnerable, would be subjected to rape or other forms of sexual
violence. This is particularly true in light of the clear intent of the criminal
enterprise to subject the targeted group to persecution through such means as
violence and humiliation.27

Similarly, in the Krstic case, the Yugoslav tribunal found General Krstic
guilty of the ‘incidental murders, rapes, beatings and abuses’ that occurred
in the context of the intended forced massive transfers of Bosnian Muslims
from Srebrenica because:
[T]here is no doubt that these crimes were the natural and foreseeable
consequences of the ethnic cleansing campaign. Furthermore, given the
circumstances at the time the plan was formed, General Krstic must have
been aware that an outbreak of these crimes would be inevitable given the lack
of shelter, the density of the crowds the vulnerable condition of the refugees,
the presence of many regular and irregular military and paramilitary units in
the area and the sheer lack of sufficient numbers of UN soldiers to provide
protection.28

Significantly, the tribunals have also recognised that, even if certain crimes
are not part of the original intended criminal conduct, the recurrence of
these crimes can become part of the original joint criminal enterprise if
participants in the JCE know about them and take no effective measures
to prevent them. As the ICTY explained in the Krajisnik case:
Whether other crimes were ‘original’ to the common objective or were added
later is of course a matter of evidence, not logical analysis. The Chamber’s
preference is for a strictly empirical approach which does not speculate about
the crime–profile of the original JCE objective, but conceptualizes the
common objective as fluid in its criminal means. An expansion of the
criminal means of the objective is proven when leading members of the JCE
are informed of new types of crime committed pursuant to the
implementation of the common objective, take no effective measures to
prevent recurrence of such crimes, and persist in the implementation of the
common objective of the JCE. Where this holds, JCE members are shown to
have accepted the expansion of means, since implementation of the common

27

28

Kvocka para 327. Note, however, that ultimately the Trial Chamber in Kvocka did not
hold any of the accused responsible for crimes beyond the original criminal enterprise
of persecuting non-Serbs. Prosecutor v Kvocka (28 February 2005) IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal
Judgment, para 86 (Kvocka Appeal Judgment). Further, while the Trial Chamber
convicted the accused of persecution as a crime against humanity, based in part on acts
of rape and sexual assault, Kvocka (n 24 above) paras 752, 755, 758, 761 & 764, the
Appeal Chamber later overturned this conviction with respect to the accused Kvocka
on the basis that the Trial Chamber had failed to determine whether the rapes and
sexual assaults occurred during Kvocka’s period of employment at the Omarska camp.
Kvocka Appeal Judgment (above) paras 329-334.
Prosecutor v Krstic (2 August 2001), IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, para 616-17. See also
Prosecutor v Karemera & Others (2 February 2012), ICTR-98-44-T, paras 1476, 1490
(finding the accused responsible for rapes and sexual assaults committed against Tutsi
women and girls because these crimes were the natural and foreseeable consequences
of the joint criminal enterprise to destroy the Tutsi population in Rwanda).
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objective can no longer be understood to be limited to commission of the
original crimes. With acceptance of the actual commission of new types of
crime and continued contribution to the objective, comes intent, meaning that
subsequent commission of such crimes by the JCE will give rise to liability
under JCE form 1.29

This has meant that the tribunals may hold participants in a JCE
accountable when sexual violence that accompanies other criminal
conduct recurs and remains unaddressed by those participants.30 Again,
these developments have had important implications for the prosecution of
sexual and gender-based violence as, historically, crimes of sexual violence
were perceived as ‘incidental’ or ‘opportunistic’ in relation to other ‘core’
crimes,31 and therefore, not subject to prosecution.
One other important development in this area relates to indirect
criminal responsibility, which allows tribunals to hold an accused in a
position of superior authority responsible for acts committed by his or her
subordinates if he or she knew or should have known such crimes had been
or were about to be committed and did nothing to prevent the crimes or
punish the perpetrators.32 This theory was used, for instance, by the
Rwanda tribunal in the Nyiramasuhuko case, to hold Pauline
Nyiramasuhuko, the former Minister of Family and Women’s
Development in Rwanda and the first female accused to be brought before
any international criminal tribunal, criminally responsible for rape, both as

29
30

31

32

Prosecutor v Krajisnik (27 September 2006) IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para 1098.
See eg Krajisnik (n 29 above) paras 1098, 1105 & 1118. Although the Appeals Chamber
later reversed the Trial Chamber’s findings with respect to the accused’s liability for the
expanded crimes, it did so because the Trial Chamber had failed to make specific
findings regarding, among other things, when leading JCE members became ‘aware’ of
the commission of expanded crimes. Prosecutor v Krajisnik (17 March 2009) IT-00-39-A,
Appeal Judgment, paras 170-178 (Krajisnik Appeal Judgment). Indeed, the Appeals
Chamber explicitly noted that the Trial Chamber’s approach – of deriving intent to
commit the expanded crimes from ‘acceptance of the actual commission of new types
of crime and continued contribution to the objective’ – did not constitute an error of
law. Krajisnik Appeal Judgment (above) para 200.
See P Viseur Sellers & K Okuizumi ‘International prosecution of sexual assaults’
(1997) 7 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 61-62 (noting that ‘[s]exual
assaults committed during armed conflict are often rationalized as the result of a
perpetrator’s lust, libidinal needs, or stress’); C Eboe-Osuji ‘Rape and superior
responsibility: International criminal law in need of adjustment’ International
Criminal Court Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor (2005) 6 (arguing
that ‘the theory of individualistic opportunism proceeds ... from the ... modest premise
that rape is a crime of opportunity which, during conflict, is frequently committed by
arms-bearing men, indulging their libidos, under cover of the chaotic circumstances of
armed conflict’).
ICTY Statute (n 5 above) art 7(3): ‘The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2
to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.’ See also Prosecutor v Kordi? & ?erkez (17 December 2004) IT-9514/2-A, Appeals Judgment, para 839.
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a crime against humanity and as a war crime of outrages upon personal
dignity.33

3

Challenges remaining in the investigation and
prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence
in the context of mass atrocities

Despite these advances, considerable challenges remain in the effort to
hold senior military and civilian officials accountable for crimes of sexual
and gender-based violence, including (i) ambiguity in the jurisprudence
regarding whether prosecuting rape in the context of mass atrocity crimes
requires proof of ‘non-consent of the victim’; (ii) critique of theories of
criminal responsibility that have been relied upon to find perpetrators –
particularly top political or military leaders – accountable for crimes of
sexual violence; and (iii) inadequate investigation and prosecution of
crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, even where evidence of such
crimes arguably warrants further investigation and/or prosecution.

3.1

Ambiguity regarding whether prosecuting rape in the
context of mass atrocity crimes requires proof of nonconsent of the victim

Notwithstanding the advances discussed in the previous section, the
jurisprudence of the tribunals reflects ongoing tension about how to
understand – and therefore how to prove – crimes of sexual violence in the
context of conflict, mass violence or repression. In particular, the
jurisprudence reflects ambiguity about whether to require ‘non-consent of
the victim’ as an element in the prosecution of rape, and how to interpret
that element.
For instance, although the first ad hoc tribunal case which addressed
the legal elements of rape defined rape without reference to non-consent,
requiring only that the prosecution show ‘a physical invasion of a sexual
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’,34
later ICTY and ICTR cases introduced non-consent as an element of the
crime by requiring proof that the sexual act was committed without the
consent of the victim and that the perpetrator knew such consent was

33

34

Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko & Others (24 June 2011) ICTR-98-42-T, Trial Judgment,
paras 6088 & 6183. In this case, the superior responsibility theory was critical, as the
prosecution failed to charge Nyiramasuhuko with direct criminal responsibility despite
significant evidence that she had issued direct orders for soldiers under her effective
control to rape Tutsi women before loading them onto trucks and taking them to
various places in Butare to be killed. Nyiramasuhuko paras 6087 & 6182.
Akayesu (n 10 above) para 598.
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absent.35 While the tribunals concede in these later cases that a lack of
consent can be established through the ‘existence of coercive
circumstances under which meaningful consent is not possible’,36 the
absence of consent remains central to the definition of rape, leading to a
conflation of the concepts of non-consent and coercion.37 Additionally, in
its first case involving allegations of rape, the SCSL defined the elements
of rape as including ‘non-consensual penetration’ of the victim.38 Much
like the ad hoc tribunals, the Special Court acknowledged that ‘[c]onsent of
the victim must be given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will,
assessed in the context of the surroundings’, and that ‘in situations of
armed conflict, coercion is almost always universal’,39 yet it made it clear
that the prosecution of rape, even in the context of mass atrocity crimes,
requires proof of the non-consent of the victim. On the other hand, the
ICC’s Elements of Crimes do not explicitly require that the prosecution
establish a lack of consent.40 Nevertheless, they do require a showing that
the perpetrator committed a physical invasion of a sexual nature against
the victim ‘by force, or threat of force or coercion, abuse of power, against
such a person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment, or that the invasion was committed against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent’.41 Notably, the Court has yet to
interpret this phrase, and, as one commentator has noted, there is a risk
that ‘judges of the ICC will deviate from the more principled focus on
coercion ... and will [instead] attempt to embrace, in a single test, concepts
[of non-consent and coercion]’42that have marked the jurisprudence of the
ad hoc tribunals.
As the former legal advisor on gender issues to the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals, Patricia Viseur Sellers, has noted, the existence of
different and potentially-inconsistent international legal definitions of rape
have the potential to undermine the extent to which survivors of rape can
exercise their right to equal protection, in particular, their right to equal
access to justice.43 As Viseur Sellers cautions, the different definitions
might well mean that ‘a 16 year-old girl victim of the Sierra Leone civil war

35
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43

Kunarac (n 8 above) para 460; Gacumbitsi (n 20 above) para 153.
Gacumbitsi (n 20 above) para 153.
For a discussion of the non-consent issue in the jurisprudence of the international
tribunals, see generally K O’Byrne ‘Beyond consent: Conceptualising sexual assault in
international criminal law’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law Review 500-502 504508.
Prosecutor v Brima & Others (20 June 2007) SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, paras 693
(AFRC Trial Judgment).
AFRC Trial Judgment (n 38 above) para 694.
ICC Elements of Crimes (n 14 above) arts 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1 & 8(2)(e)(vi)-1.
As above.
Byrne (n 37 above) 513.
P Viseur Sellers ‘The prosecution of sexual violence in conflict: the importance of
human rights as means of interpretation’ United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (2007) 27, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/
women/docs/Paper_Prosecution_of_Sexual_Violence.pdf (accessed 10 January
2012).
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[is] less protected against gender violence than, for example, a 16 year-old
girl whose perpetrator will be judged by the ICC’.44

3.2

Critique of theories of criminal responsibility used to find
top officials accountable for crimes of sexual and genderbased violence

A second obstacle to the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes is
that the theories of criminal responsibility that courts have relied on to find
perpetrators, particularly top political or military leaders, accountable for
crimes of sexual violence have been either been criticised or inconsistently
applied in cases involving gender-based violence.
For instance, as mentioned earlier,45 the JCE theory of liability allows
tribunals to hold accountable perpetrators who intentionally take part in a
JCE, not only for the intended crimes, but also for other crimes that were
the natural and foreseeable consequences of the intended crimes. Yet,
many remain critical of this theory of liability. Indeed, commentators have
taken the position that this form of liability holds individuals liable for
conduct too distant from the actions of the accused and, thus, ‘endanger[s]
the principle of individual and culpable responsibility by introducing a
form of collective liability, or guilt by association’.46 As one commentator
has argued, this extended form of JCE liability might as well be called ‘just
convict everyone’.47 Thus, even though this mode of liability has been
useful in holding perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence
accountable,48 it is unclear whether and to what extent it will continue to
be used successfully to prosecute such crimes.
Perhaps more significantly, even modes of responsibility that are not
as controversial – such as holding accused persons responsible on the
theory of superior responsibility discussed above49 – have been
inconsistently applied in cases involving gender-based violence. As noted
earlier, under the doctrine of superior responsibility, a superior can be held
responsible for the acts of his or her subordinates where (i) a superiorsubordinate relationship exists; (ii) the superior knew or had reason to
know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii)
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
44
45
46

47
48
49

Viseur Seller (n 43 above).
Tadic (n 23 above) and accompanying text.
S Manacorda & C Meloni ‘Indirect perpetration versus joint criminal enterprise:
Concurring approaches in the practice of international criminal law?’ (2011) 9 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 166-67. See also AM Danner & JS Martinez ‘Guilty
associations: Joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, and the development
of international criminal law’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 111.
ME Badar ‘Just convict everyone!’ - Joint perpetration: From Tadic to Stakic and back
again’ (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 302.
See Kvocka (n 27 above) and accompanying text.
See nn 32-33 above and accompanying text.
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prevent the criminal act or to punish the physical perpetrator thereof.50
Although the tribunals have acknowledged that the knowledge element of
the superior responsibility test can be established through circumstantial
evidence,51 in the Kajelijeli case, the ICTR effectively applied a higher
standard of evidence, refusing to find that the accused knew or had reason
to know of numerous acts of sexual violence committed by his
subordinates despite testimony placing him at the scene of the rapes or in
the immediate vicinity of the rapes,52 and indicating that he had been
present when his subordinates had told victims that they would be sexually
assaulted,53 as well as other evidence that he was ‘informed of all the acts
perpetrated by his [subordinates]’, was in ‘permanent contact’ with them
and received reports from them on what they had done.54 Thus, although
the tribunals have recognised that circumstantial evidence can be used to
prove that a superior had reason to know crimes had been or were about
to be committed by his subordinates, here the tribunal appeared to reject
that standard, requiring direct evidence of a superior’s knowledge of his
subordinates’ actions, either by showing that the accused was physically
present at the scene of the crime or that he had given his subordinates direct
orders to commit the crime.55 As one commentator has noted:
While in theory it should not be particularly complicated to hold political/
civilian or military leaders criminally responsible, either as individuals or as
superiors, for sexual violence when the crimes are widespread or systematic,
not to mention notorious, in practice there has been enormous reluctance to
hold leaders and non-physical perpetrators accountable for sex crimes, as
opposed to other crimes.56

3.3

Inadequate investigation and prosecution of sexual and
gender-based violence

Despite the jurisprudential advances mentioned above, international
tribunals have been critiqued for inadequately investigating and
prosecuting crimes of sexual and gender-based violence even where
evidence of such crimes arguably warrants investigation and/or
prosecution.57 For instance, as indicated earlier, the statute of the SCSL
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

See n 32 above and accompanying text.
See eg Prosecutor v Galic (30 November 2006) IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment,
paras 117, 182 & 518 (affirming, at least in principle, that a conviction of superior
responsibility may be made on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone).
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (1 December 2003) ICTR-98-44A-T, Trial Judgment, dissenting
opinion of Ramaroson J paras 17, 19, 37, 42 & 73 (Kajelijeli Ramoroson dissenting
opinion).
Kajelijeli Ramoroson dissenting opinion paras 19, 33 & 38.
Kajelijeli Ramaroson dissenting opinion paras 17 & 39.
Kajelijeli(n 52 above) paras 683 & 924.
Askin (n 22 above) 155.
See eg B Nowrojee ‘”Your justice is too slow.” Will the ICTR fail Rwanda's rape
victims?’ United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Occasional Paper
10, 2005; S Kendall & M Staggs ‘Silencing sexual violence: recent developments in the
CDF case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ University of California Berkeley War
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includes a range of gender-based crimes against humanity and war
crimes.58 Nevertheless, despite significant evidence relating to crimes of
sexual violence committed by the Civilian Defence Force (CDF) – a progovernment militia that fought during Sierra Leone’s 11-year civil war –
the prosecution omitted any allegations with respect to these crimes in its
initial indictment against the three leaders of the CDF.59 Although it later
moved to amend the indictment to include such crimes, the Court refused
to allow the amendment.60
A more recent example occurred in the case of Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, the first person tried by the ICC. Human rights groups criticised the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) for failing to include sexual violence
charges in the original indictment against Lubanga, despite allegations that
girls had been kidnapped into Lubanga’s militia and were often raped and/
or kept as sex slaves.61 Notwithstanding such criticism, the prosecutor
refused to seek an amendment of the indictment against Lubanga to
include gender-based crimes.62

57

58
59
60
61

62

Crimes Studies Centre, 2005, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/Papers/
Silencing_Sexual_Violence.pdf (accessed 10 January 2012); SM Pritchett ‘Entrenched
hegemony, efficient procedure, or selective justice? An inquiry into charges for genderbased violence at the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 17 Transnational Law and
Contemporary Problems 265; S SáCouto & K Cleary ‘The importance of effective
investigation of sexual violence and gender-based crimes at the International Criminal
Court (2009) 17 American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 339;
Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice ‘Gender report card on the International
Criminal Court’ 2005-2010, http://www.iccwomen.org/publications/index.php
(accessed 10 January 2012).
See n 16 above and accompanying text.
Prosecutor v Norman & Others (4 February 2004) SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, paras 22-29
(describing the multiple charges filed against Norman, Fofana and Kondewa,
including murder).
Prosecutor v Norman & Others (20 May 2004) SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution
Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, para 10 (describing various crimes that
were committed, including rape, sexual slavery and other inhumane acts).
See ‘DR Congo: ICC charges raise concern’ joint letter from Avocats Sans Frontières et al
to the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 31 July 2006, http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/01/congo13891_txt.htm (accessed 10 January 2012):
‘We are disappointed that two years of investigation by your office in the DRC has not
yielded a broader range of charges against Mr Lubanga ... We believe that you, as the
prosecutor, must send a clear signal to the victims in Ituri and the people of the DRC
that those who perpetrate crimes such as rape, torture and summary executions will be
held to account.’ Statement by the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice on the arrest
of Germain Katanga’ Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice Press Release, 18
October 2007: ‘The lack of charges for sexual violence against Lubanga was seen by
many local DRC NGOs and ourselves to be a significant omission given the
availability of information, witnesses and documentation from multiple sources
including the United Nations and various human rights organisations showing the
widespread commission of rape and other forms of sexualised violence by the UPC
militia group.’ ‘ICC prosecutor leaves unfinished business in Ituri, DRC’ Redress Press
Statement, 13 February 2008, revised 20 February 2008: ‘There is resentment that
Thomas Lubanga and the UPC militia that he led are getting away too lightly. Arrested
by the ICC in March 2006, Lubanga is said to be responsible for widespread killings
and countless incidents of sexual violence. Yet, Lubanga has only been charged with
recruiting and using child soldiers.’
Prosecutor v Lubanga (29 January 2007) ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges.
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Unfortunately, these are not isolated examples. According to a
detailed analysis of trends in the prosecution of sexual violence in the
Rwanda tribunal from November 1995 to November 2002, for instance,
the number of indictments of sexual violence levelled-off between 1996
and 2001, and then decreased sharply through the end of 2002.63 In two of
the later cases in which crimes of sexual violence were charged, the
prosecution later sought to withdraw the charges due to insufficient
evidence.64 Similar problems have occurred at the ICC. For instance, in
the case against militia leaders Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo,
the prosecutor dropped charges of sexual slavery as both a war crime and
a crime against humanity after a pre-trial chamber judge excluded the
statements of witnesses supporting those charges on the grounds that the
witnesses were not adequately protected.65 The situation was resolved
after the witnesses were eventually accepted into the Court’s witness
protection programme,66 and the prosecution amended its charges not
only to reinstate those relating to sexual slavery, but also to include
allegations of rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity.67
However, the tug-of-war over these victims’ statements indicates the
vulnerability of sexual violence charges if the supporting evidence is
limited and subject to challenge. Notably, a recent report analysing charges
for gender-based crimes at the ICC shows that
[t]hese charges are the most vulnerable category of crimes, in that they tend to
be either omitted from filings or fail to reach the trial phase of the
proceedings. This vulnerability is based on a number of factors involving both
the Office of the Prosecutor and the pre-trial chambers, including failures at
the investigation phase, insufficient evidence, incorrect characterisation of
acts or restrictive interpretations of the definition of some gender-based
crimes. In some instances, gender-based crimes have not always been fully
investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor, or have not been included by the
63

64

65

66
67

G Breton-Le Goff ‘Analysis of trends in sexual violence prosecutions in indictments by
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) from November 1995 to
November 2002’ (2002) 3, http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacy
Dossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/analysisoftrends_en.php (accessed 11
January 2012). See also Oosterveld (n 11 above) 127, citing Changing the International
Tribunal letter from Human Rights Watch to UN Security Council Members, Rwanda
and the Security Council, 1 August 2003 (noting a significant drop in the number of
indictments, including charges for crimes of sexual violence from 1999 to 2003).
Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi (20 August 2003) ICTR-2001-71-I, Decision on Prosecution
Motion for Leave to Amend Indictment, para 1; Prosecutor v Muvunyi (23 February
2005) ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Indictment, para 54.
Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui (25 April 2008) ICC-01-04-01-07, Decision on Evidentiary
Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Art
67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, para 39 (allowing the testimony of a
witness for whom the prosecution could show adequate protection, but barring the
statements of two other witnesses who had not been included in the Witness
Protection Programme).
Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui (28 May 2008) ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on
Prosecution’s Urgent Application for the Admission of the Evidence of Witnesses 132
and 287, paras 6-7.
Prosecutor v Katanga & Chui (26 June 2008) ICC-01/04-01/07, Submission of Amended
Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Decision, paras 32-33.
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Prosecutor in his request for an arrest warrant or summons to appear, even in
situations where such information was provided to the prosecutor by NGOs.
Charges for gender-based crimes have also not been included or have been
minimally included in situations in which the prosecutor’s request to open an
investigation contains significant amounts of information showing that such
crimes were committed.68

In sum, sexual and gender-based crimes have often been left out of the
prosecution’s investigation or case against the accused, even where
evidence of such crimes arguably warrants investigation and prosecution.

4

Looking at human rights law to fill the gaps

The obvious question raised by these challenges is: What can be done
about them? One potential answer that has not received much attention is
the application to these issues of one of the most fundamental principles in
human rights law, namely, the principle of non-discrimination, in
particular the requirement that access to justice be free from gender-based
discrimination. As discussed below, the application of this principle to the
analysis of the issues raised in the section above would require decision
makers to take a gender-sensitive approach to such issues which, in turn,
would help address the outstanding challenges that have made it difficult
to hold senior military and civilian officials accountable for crimes of
sexual and gender-based violence.

4.1

Connection between gender-based violence and genderbased discrimination

As the Committee that oversees states’ compliance with the United
Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) acknowledged as early as
1992, ‘[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality
with men’.69 Regional human rights bodies have similarly emphasised that
gender-based violence ‘is one of the most extreme and pervasive forms of
discrimination, severely impairing and nullifying the enforcement of
women’s rights’.70 Indeed, gender-based violence is often a product of

68

69
70

Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice ‘Gender report card on the International
Criminal Court’ 2011 (WIGJ 2011 ICC Gender Report Card) 122, http://
www.iccwomen.org/documents/Gender-Report-Card-on-the-International-CriminalCourt-2011.pdf (accessed 10 January 2012).
CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 19 on violence against women, UN
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev7 (1992) para 1.
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States, Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights, IAmComm of HR (21 July 2011), Case 12.626, Report 80/11, para 110.
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Understanding this connection affects the way in which courts might
analyse allegations of sexual and gender-based violence in two ways. First,
it requires courts to acknowledge that gender-based violence and sexual
violence, in particular, that take place during periods of conflict, mass
violence or repression, are frequently part of a broader picture of
discrimination. Indeed, it requires courts to recognise, for instance, that
rape, forced nudity, sexual torture and other similar acts are often used to
facilitate other crimes precisely because of the gendered way in which such
crimes are viewed in many societies. For instance, deep and enduring
social stigma often attaches to victims of gender crimes, enabling
perpetrators not only to harm the individual victim, but also to tear at the
fabric of her community.72
In the case against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF case),73 for
example, the SCSL recognised how the RUF was able to rely on preexisting societal discrimination against victims of sexual violence to
accomplish their goal of terrorising civilians, noting that the sexual
violence crimes they committed not only ‘abused, debased and isolated the
individual victim’, but also ‘deliberately destroyed [their] existing family
nucleus’.74 By relying upon the societal stigma associated with sexual
violence, they were able to ensure that ‘[v]ictims of sexual violence were
ostracised, husbands left their wives, and daughters and young girls were
unable to marry within their community’.75 The Court therefore
concluded that the RUF had adopted a ‘calculated and concerted pattern
… to use sexual violence as a weapon of terror’ against civilians, thereby
breaking their will and ensuring their submission to RUF control.76

71
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CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 19 (n 69 above) para 11 (‘Traditional
attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or as having stereotyped
roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or coercion, such as family
violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female
circumcision. Such prejudices and practices may justify gender-based violence as a
form of protection or control of women. The effect of such violence on the physical
and mental integrity of women is to deprive them the equal enjoyment, exercise and
knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’) See also JG Gardam & MJ
Jarvis Women, armed conflict and international law (2001) 25.
See eg ‘Rape and sexual assault’ in Final Report of the United Nations Commission of
Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674/Add.2,
vol V, annex IX.I.C (1994); R Seifert ‘War and rape: A preliminary analysis’ in A
Stiglmayer (ed) Mass rape: The war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994) 62-64.
Prosecutor v Sesay & Others (2 March 2009) SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment (RUF case).
RUF case (n 73 above) para 1349.
As above.
RUF case (n 73 above) para 1347.
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This fuller understanding helps to explain the interconnected, and
cumulative, nature of harms in situations of conflict, mass violence or
repression,77 and therefore allows for a better evaluation of how to
understand and charge gender-based crimes, how to link them to the
accused and whether they should be investigated and prosecuted.
Second, acknowledging the link between gender-based violence and
gender discrimination requires courts to examine how their interpretation
of the elements of gender-based crimes and modes of responsibility in
relation to such crimes – as well as whether gender-based crimes should be
investigated in the first place – may impact the right of gender-based
violence survivors to equal access to justice. Notably, the notion that the
way in which international criminal tribunals address sexual and genderbased violence must adhere to the principle of non-discrimination found in
human rights law is codified in the Rome Statute establishing the ICC,
which in article 21(3) states:
The application and interpretation of the law pursuant to this article
[including the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence] must be consistent with internationally-recognized
human rights, and be without adverse distinction founded on grounds such as
gender.78

Thus, as commentators have argued, ‘[w]hile it makes sense that … human
rights law cannot be used to define [international crimes such as
persecution], such law can surely be used to aid interpretation where there
is an absence of international criminal law jurisprudence’.79 It is argued
further that the principle of non-discrimination can and should guide
courts when considering possible interpretations of ambiguous or
uncertain provisions, or when certain actors within the court such as the
prosecutor are tasked with exercising their discretion.

4.2

Using the non-discrimination principle to address
challenges in the investigation and prosecution of sexual
and gender-based violence in the context of mass atrocities

What does this mean in practice? The section below explores the question
of how the non-discrimination principle can be used to interpret the
requisite elements of sexual violence crimes – in particular the crime of
rape – and the theories of criminal responsibility used to prosecute such
crimes. Similarly, it examines the application of the non-discrimination
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For a discussion of the interconnected and cumulative nature of harms experienced by
women in conflict, see F NíAoláin ‘Exploring a feminist theory of harm in the context
of conflicted and post-conflict societies’ (2009) 35 Queen’s Law Journal 235-236.
Rome Statute (n 12 above) art 21(3).
W Brown & L Grenfell ‘The international crime of gender-based persecution and the
Taliban’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 360-361.
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principle to the question of what crimes or suspects should be selected for
investigation and/or prosecution.

4.2.1

Application of non-discrimination principle to crimes of rape
and sexual violence

As mentioned above, the jurisprudence and statutes of the international
tribunals reflect ambiguity about whether to require ‘non-consent of the
victim’ as an element in the prosecution of rape, and how to interpret that
element. Similar uncertainty surrounds the interpretation of the Rome
Statute’s ‘sexual violence’ clause that allows the Court to exercise
jurisdiction over other serious sexual assaults of comparable gravity to the
enumerated sexual and gender-based crimes.80 Indeed, as with rape, the
definition of sexual violence under the ICC Elements of Crimes requires
proof that a perpetrator has committed an act of a sexual nature against the
victim
by force, or threat of force or coercion, abuse of power, against such a person
or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the
invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine
consent.81

Although this definition appears to allow for an interpretation of sexual
violence crimes based on the existence of coercive circumstance rather
than the lack of consent, there is a risk, as mentioned above, that judges of
the ICC will follow the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in adopting a
single test which conflates the concepts of coercion and non-consent.82
The application of the non-discrimination principle to this issue leads to a
few observations.
First, understanding the link between gender-based violence and
gender-based discrimination requires putting the acts of sexual violence
and, therefore, the issue of consent, into the broader context of the
circumstances in which the alleged acts took place. This means that, rather
than focusing primarily on the individual and whether she consented to the
acts alleged, the courts should be asking questions about the context in
which the acts took place and the vulnerability of the individual to such
acts given that context. Notably, the idea of taking context into account
when analysing cases involving rape is consistent with the approach taken
by the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) which is
tasked with monitoring states’ compliance with the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention).83 For instance, in MC v Bulgaria, a case involving
the rape of a 14 year-old girl with mental disabilities in a state where the
80
81
82

See n 12 above.
ICC Elements of Crimes (n 14 above) art 7(1)(g).
See Byrne (n 37 above) 513.
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age of consent is 14, the investigators failed to prosecute the alleged
perpetrators because of the absence of evidence of significant physical
resistance by the victim.84 Although not explicitly referring to the principle
of non-discrimination, the Court held that the ‘development of law and
practice in [this] area reflects the evolution of societies towards effective
equality and respect for each individual’s sexual autonomy’.85 As such, the
lack of consent – interpreted through a ‘context-sensitive assessment of the
evidence’86 – rather than physical resistance by the victim was the
appropriate focus of inquiry in assessing whether the victim had been
raped.87 As the Court concluded:
Any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, such as requiring
proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving certain types of
rape unpunished, thus jeopardising the effective protection of the individual's
sexual autonomy.88

Second, as other commentators have pointed out, an act of sexual violence
will only qualify as an international crime if it was committed in
circumstances which are almost always inherently coercive; that is,
circumstances involving the intended destruction of a group of people
(genocide), a widespread and systematic attack against civilians (crimes
against humanity), or an armed conflict (war crimes).89 In those
circumstances, the issue of non-consent becomes largely irrelevant.90
Third, so-called ‘gender-neutral’ crimes occurring in these contexts,
such as torture, persecution, enslavement and inhumane acts, are not
dependent upon the establishment of either the victim’s non-consent or the
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 3 September 1953 213 UNTS 222, as amended by Protocols 3, 5, 8 and 11
which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990
and 1 November 1998 respectively.
MC v Bulgaria (2003) EHRR 646.
MC v Bulgaria (n 84 above) para 165.
MC v Bulgaria (n 84 above) para 161.
MC v Bulgaria (n 84 above) para 165.
As above.
See eg W Schomburg & I Peterson ‘Genuine consent to sexual violence under
international criminal law’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 128-131.
Schomburg & Peterson (n 89 above) 138. Note that other commentators have argued
that eliminating non-consent risks diminishing victims’ agency and autonomy. See eg
K Engle ‘Feminism and its (dis)contents: Criminalising wartime rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 807. An excellent
response to this contention – made in the context of an analysis of rape as torture – can
be found in M Grahn-Farley ‘Examining Janet Halley’s critique of rape as torture’ in S
Kuovo & Z Pearson (eds) Feminist perspectives on contemporary international law: Between
resistance and compliance? (2011) 109-129, arguing that Halley’s analysis of rape as
torture and as threatening to undermine victims’ agency is problematic because it
disregards the facts of the Kunarac case on which Halley relies to make her argument,
including the testimonies of the women and girls who were victims of rape in that case.
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existence of coercive circumstances.91 If an act of physical and/or mental
harm can be prosecuted as one of these crimes, where a lack of consent is
not required, but the prosecution of rape continues to require proof of nonconsent, survivors of rape whose cases are prosecuted as such may end up
with more limited access to justice than survivors of other types of harm.92
Interestingly, in a number of cases, acts of sexual violence against men
were prosecuted not as rape or acts of sexual violence, but as acts of
persecution or other inhumane acts. In the ICTY case of Prosecutor v
Milosevic, for instance, evidence showing that men were forced to engage
in oral sex with other men was charged not as rape but as persecution,93
thereby avoiding the issue of consent. Similarly, in the ICC case of
Prosecutor v Mathuara & Others (Mathuara case), the pre-trial chamber
characterised acts of forcible circumcision as ‘other inhumane acts’,94
despite the fact that the prosecutor had classified them as a form of sexual
violence,95 again circumventing the potentially-thorny question of how to
interpret the coercion requirement. Notably, in the Mathuara case, the
chamber did not explain why forced circumcision was not a form of sexual
violence, noting only that the acts alleged were ‘more properly qualified’
as ‘other inhumane acts’ ‘in light of the serious injury to body that forcible
circumcision causes, and in view of its character, similar to other
underlying acts constituting crimes against humanity’.96 As one
commentator has noted, ‘[c]haracterising male sexual assault acts under
crimes such as torture or inhumane acts [rather than rape or sexual
violence] and possibly privilege[s] male victim/survivors over women’.97
Conversely, requiring proof of non-consent in cases prosecuted as rape or
sexual violence may undermine the extent to which survivors of such
crimes can exercise their right to equal access to justice.
Although the issue could certainly benefit from further study, at a
minimum, the analysis above suggests that in resolving potentiallyambiguous language related to the prosecution of rape and sexual
violence, including whether non-consent should be required, courts should
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See ICC Elements of Crimes (n 14 above) art 7(1)(f) (defining the crime against
humanity of torture); art 7(1)(h) (defining the crime against humanity of persecution);
art 7(1)(c) (defining the crime against humanity of enslavement); and art 7(1)(k)
(defining the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts).
Moreover, even if rape is prosecuted as one of these other crimes, such as torture or
persecution, there is a risk that survivors of rape would still be subject to questions of
consent, as acts amounting to rape would be at the heart of the prosecution.
Prosecutor v Milosevic (22 November 2002) IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment, para
35(c); Prosecutor v Milosevic (6 May 2003) IT-02-54-T, transcript http://icty
transcripts.dyndns.org/trials/slobodan_milosevic/030506IT.htm (accessed 13 January
2012) (testimony of male witness regarding incident where men were forced to engage
in oral sex with other men).
Prosecutor v Mathuara & Others (8 March 2011) ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for a Summons to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura,
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, para 27.
Mathuara case (n 94 above) para 27.
Mathuara case (n 94 above) para 27.
Viesur Sellers (n 43 above) 39.
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be particularly wary of interpretations that might result in discrimination
against survivors of such crimes.

4.2.2

Application of non-discrimination principle to modes of
criminal responsibility

Similar observations apply with respect to the challenges discussed above
regarding the theories of responsibility that courts have relied upon to hold
perpetrators of gender-based violence accountable. When sexual and
gender-based violence is understood as part of a broader picture of
discrimination, and therefore seen in the broader context in which it
occurs, courts are better able to recognise, as the Special Court did in the
RUF case,98 how sexual violence can contribute to a perpetrator’s goals of
destruction or persecution, not only of the survivor, but also of the group
or community to which she belongs. Understood this way, sexual violence
crimes that at first might not appear to be part of a group’s common
criminal purpose could be properly characterised as such, avoiding the
need to rely on the controversial JCE theory of liability, which allows an
accused to be held criminally liable for the natural and foreseeable
consequences of a group’s intended crimes.99
At the same time, the recognition of the link between sexual and
gender-based violence and gender-based discrimination also creates an
incentive for courts to question whether they are, in fact, requiring a higher
level of proof when assessing certain modes of liability, such as superior
responsibility in cases involving sexual and gender-based crimes than in
other types of cases and, if so, whether they are effectively undermining the
right of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence to equal access to
justice.

4.2.3

Application of the non-discrimination principle to the selection
of crimes and suspects for investigation and/or prosecution

Finally, the non-discrimination principle could also help answer the
question of whether sexual and gender-based crimes should be selected for
investigation and prosecution. As mentioned earlier, historically, sexual
and gender-based crimes were rarely prosecuted. Indeed, sexual violence
offences, particularly against women and girls, were often ignored, seen as
an inevitable by-product of war, or considered less important than other
forms of violence.100 The harm inherent in acts of sexual violence was thus

98 See nn 73-76 above and accompanying text.
99 See nn 46-47 and accompanying text.
100 See n 3 above and accompanying text.
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compounded by the discriminatory characterisation of those acts as falling
outside the boundaries of core international crimes.101 As commentators
have noted, the prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence crimes
today marks a break with the past history of discriminatory
marginalisation of such crimes.102 Indeed, the public prosecution of these
crimes constitutes a ‘form of political recognition for women’ – an
acknowledgment that the harms women experience during conflict, mass
violence or repression should be ‘treated seriously by an international
community that previously ignored them’.103 In the light of this history,
applying the non-discrimination principle to the question of which crimes
should be selected for investigation and prosecution suggests that sexual
and gender-based crimes should feature prominently in a prosecutor’s
investigation and charging strategy from the outset.
This view is supported by article 21(3) of the Rome Statute which, as
noted above, requires the application and interpretation of the Court’s
governing documents to ‘be consistent with internationally-recognised
human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds
such as gender’.104 The provision has been characterised as one of the
‘more important provisions of the Rome Statute’,105 and included to
‘reaffirm the international community’s commitment to the principle of
non-discrimination in the context of the International Criminal Court’.106
Prioritising the investigation and prosecution of crimes historically
marginalised by the international community is arguably what article 21(3)
requires.

5

Conclusion

In sum, it is submitted that the tribunals have had a mixed record at best
when it comes to the prosecution of gender crimes. Significant advances
have been made in the effort to end impunity for sexual and gender-based
violence committed in the context of war, mass violence or repression.
However, persistent challenges remain. It is hoped that the application of
the fundamental human rights principle of non-discrimination will
encourage international tribunals to develop a better, more nuanced
101 See eg GJ McDougall ‘Contemporary forms of slavery, systematic rape, sexual slavery
and slavery-like practices during armed conflict’ 22 June 1998 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/
13, para 18 (noting that ‘even more damaging than the veil of silence that surrounds
rape and sexual violation is the tendency to marginalise acts of violence when
committed against women’). Notably, the absence of effective responses to genderbased violence committed in ‘peace time’ has also been found to constitute
discrimination. See Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v United States (n 70 above) paras 160-63.
102 D Buss ‘Performing legal order: Some feminist thoughts on international criminal law’
(2011) 11 International Criminal Law Review 409.
103 Buss (n 102 above) 414.
104 Rome Statute (n 12 above) art 21(2).
105 Steains (n 3 above) 371; M deGuzman ‘Article 21, applicable law’ in O Triffterer (ed)
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the ICC (2008) 712.
106 DeGuzman (n 105 above) 712.
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understanding of when, why and how sexual violence takes place during
conflict or other instances of mass violence and, therefore, assist them in
better evaluating how the elements of sexual violence crimes should be
interpreted, what theories of criminal responsibility can and should be used
to prosecute such crimes, and/or whether such crimes should be selected
for investigation and prosecution.
It goes without saying that the application of this principle hinges, in
large part, on the acquisition of increased gender competence and gender
expertise among the investigators, prosecutors and judges tasked with
adjudicating these crimes. While progress has been made in this regard,
there is still a long way to go.107 If the tribunals continue to operate on the
basis of limited gender competence and expertise, they risk permitting and
promoting discriminatory interpretations of the laws, rules and policies
that affect the potential for redress for victims of sexual and gender-based
violence. In doing so, they risk failing to achieve one of the most
fundamental aims of the international justice system: to ensure that ‘the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
[do] not go unpunished’.108

107 Eg, despite the fact that art 44(2) of the Rome Statute requires the prosecutor and the
registrar to consider the importance of legal expertise on violence against women in
hiring staff within their respective organs, commentators have highlighted that gender
expertise remains limited at the ICC. See eg Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice
‘Gender report card on the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 64, http://
www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/GRC10-WEB-11-10-v4_Final-version-Dec.pdf
(accessed 13 January 2012) 62 (recommending the appointment of ‘more staff with
gender expertise’ in the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor in order to ‘ensure the
integration of gender issues within the heightened case load expected for 2011’, noting
that ‘[g]ender expertise within the OTP is essential ... to support institutional capacity
on these issues, and to enhance the integration of gender issues in the discussions and
decisions regarding investigations, the construction of case hypotheses, the selection of
cases and prosecution strategy’).
108 Rome Statute (n 12 above) Preamble.
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WOMEN, SEXUAL RIGHTS AND
POVERTY: FRAMING THE
LINKAGE UNDER THE AFRICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

Fana Hagos Berhane

Summary
The concept of sexual rights consists of sets of rights recognised under
international and regional human rights instruments, including everyone’s
right to enjoy freedom from coercion, discrimination and violence around
sexuality, irrespective of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The
violation of these sexual rights can be both a cause and consequence of
poverty. The aim of this chapter is to frame the linkage between violations of
women’s sexual rights and poverty in the African context. Any effort towards
the eradication of poverty in the region improves the realisation and
protection of the sexual rights of women. Realising sexual rights, in turn,
helps to end poverty.

1

Introduction

The concept of sexual rights consists of sets of rights that everyone should
enjoy, including freedom from coercion, discrimination and violence
around sexuality irrespective of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
Sexual rights embrace human rights that are already recognised under
international and regional human rights documents and other consensus
statements. However, the realisation of women’s sexual rights in practice
depends on crucial enabling conditions. Deciding about sexual autonomy
is not possible without full information about safer sex, the possibility of
preventing the body from being violated by others, the opportunity to
protect oneself from unwanted pregnancy or the freedom to express and
enjoy one’s sexual orientation without fear of violence or discrimination.
Women’s lack of realisation of human rights is not reducible to an
issue of poverty. However, women’s inability to enforce human rights
means that they are more vulnerable to poverty than men. Poverty drives
women into activities where they become vulnerable to human rights
abuses. Acknowledging the importance of sexuality as a determinant of
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